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1. Main Source: Herodotus *Histories* [also, a wikipedia search]

Nearly all of the sources for the account of the battle come ultimately from the Greek historian Herodotus, writing in his *Histories*. Historically, Herodotus has often been derided even by other ancient writers. However, recent archaeological finds have tended to confirm specific claims made by Herodotus, and have done much to restore his reputation.^[1] Nevertheless, it remains true that Herodotus often appears to have exaggerated, or simply to have recounted what he was 'told' without much critical appraisal.^[2]


2. Background

The Greek city-states of Athens and Eretria had supported the unsuccessful Ionian Revolt against the Persian Empire of **Darius I** in **499-494 BC**. Darius swore revenge on these two city-states, and also saw the opportunity to expand his empire into the fractious world of Ancient Greece.^[3] A preliminary expedition under **Mardonius**, in **492 BCE**, to secure the land approaches to Greece ended with the re-conquest of Thrace and forced Macedon to become a client kingdom of Persia.^[4] In **491 BCE**, Darius sent emissaries to all the Greek city-states asking for a gift of 'earth and water' in token of their submission to him.^[5] Having had a demonstration of his power the previous year, the majority of Greek cities obliged. In Athens, however, the ambassadors were put on trial and then executed; in Sparta, they were simply thrown down a well.^[5] This meant that Sparta was also now effectively at war with Persia.^[5] Darius thus put together an amphibious task force under **Datis** and **Artaphernes** in **490 BCE** to attack Naxos, before receiving the submission of the other Cycladic Islands. The task force then moved on Eretria, which it besieged and destroyed.^[6] Finally, it moved to attack Athens, landing at the bay of Marathon, where it was met by a heavily outnumbered army of Athenians. At the ensuing **Battle of Marathon**, the Athenians won a remarkable victory, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Persian army to Asia.^[7] **[note: in 2010, the Greeks will celebrate the 2500-year anniversary of the famous battle].**



Map of the Greek world at the time of the battle

Darius therefore began raising a huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate Greece; however, in **486 BCE**, his Egyptian subjects revolted, indefinitely postponing any Greek expedition.^[9] Darius then died whilst preparing to march on Egypt, and the throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I. Xerxes crushed the Egyptian revolt, and very quickly re-started the preparations for the invasion of Greece. Since this was to be a full scale invasion, it required long-term planning, stock-piling and conscription. Xerxes decided that the Hellespont would be bridged to allow his army to cross to Europe, and that a canal should be dug across the isthmus of Mt Athos (rounding which headland, a Persian fleet had been destroyed in **492 BCE**). These were both feats of exceptional ambition, which would have been beyond any contemporary state.^[9] By early **480 BCE**, the preparations were complete, and the army which Xerxes had mustered at Sardis marched towards Europe, crossing the Hellespont on two pontoon bridges.^[9] The Athenians had also been preparing for war with the Persians since the mid-480s BC, and in **482 BCE** the decision was taken, under the guidance of the Athenian politician **Themistocles**, to build a massive fleet of triremes that would be necessary for the Greeks to fight the Persians^[3]. However, the Athenians did not have the manpower to fight on land and sea; and therefore combatting the Persians would require an alliance of Greek city states. In **481 BCE**, Xerxes sent ambassadors around Greece asking for earth and water, but making the very deliberate omission of Athens and Sparta.^[10] Support thus began to coalesce around these two leading states. A congress of city states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC,^[11] and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed. It had the power to send envoys asking for assistance and to dispatch troops from the member states to defensive points after joint consultation. This was remarkable for the disjointed Greek world, especially since many of the city-states in attendance were still technically at war with each other.^[3]



Army and Navy Movements to Salamis

The 'Allies' adopted a strategy of blocking the land and sea approaches to southern Greece.^[12] In August **480 BCE**, after hearing of Xerxes's approach, a small army led by the Spartan king Leonidas I blocked the Pass of Thermopylae, whilst an Athenian-dominated navy sailed to the Straits of Artemisium. Famously, the outnumbered Greek army held Thermopylae against the Persians army for six days in total, before being outflanked by a mountain path. Although much of the Greek army retreated, the rearguard of Spartans and Thespians were surrounded and killed.^[3] The simultaneous Battle of Artemisium was up to that point a stalemate;^[13] however, when news of Thermopylae reached them, they also retreated, since holding the straits of Artemisium was now a moot point.^[14] The Allied fleet had then sailed from Artemisium to Salamis to assist with the final evacuation of Athens, whilst the mostly Peloponnesian Allied army prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth.^[15] Following Thermopylae, the Persian army had proceeded to burn and sack the Boeotian cities which had not surrendered, **Plataea** and Thespieae; before taking possession of the now-evacuated city of Athens. Xerxes wished for a final crushing defeat of the Allies to finish the conquest of Greece in that campaigning season; conversely the Allies sought a decisive victory over the Persian navy that would guarantee the security of the Peloponnesus.^[16] The ensuing naval Battle of Salamis ended in a decisive victory for the Greeks, marking (in retrospect) a turning point in the conflict.^[17]

Following the defeat of his navy at Salamis, Xerxes retreated to Asia with the bulk of the army. He left Mardonius with handpicked troops to complete the conquest of Greece the following year.^[18] Mardonius evacuated Attica, and wintered in Thessaly;^[19] with the Athenians reoccupying their destroyed city.^[17] Over the winter, there seems to have been some tension between the Allies. In particular, the Athenians, who were not protected by the Isthmus, but whose fleet were the key to the security of the Peloponnese, felt hard done by, and demanded an Allied army march north the following year.^[17] When the Allies failed to commit, the Athenian fleet refused to join the Allied navy in Spring. The navy, now under the command of the Spartan king **Leotychides**, skulked off Delos, and the remnants of the Persian fleet skulked off Samos, both unwilling to risk battle.^[20] Similarly, Mardonius remained in Thessaly, knowing an attack on the Isthmus was pointless, whilst the Allies refused to send an army outside the Peloponnese.^[17]

Mardonius moved to break the stalemate, by offering peace, self-government and territorial expansion to the Athenians (with the aim of removing their fleet from the Allied forces), using **Alexander I of Macedon** as intermediate.^[20] The Athenians made sure that a Spartan delegation was on hand to hear the offer, but rejected it [*The degree to which we are put in the shadow by the Medes' strength is hardly something you need to bring to our attention. We are already well aware of it. But even so, such is our love of liberty, that we will never surrender.*]^[20] Athens was thus evacuated again, and the Persians marched south and re-took possession of it. Mardonius now repeated his offer of peace to the Athenian refugees on Salamis. Athens, along with **Megara** and **Plataea** sent emissaries to Sparta demanding assistance, and threatening to accept the Persian terms if not.^[21] According to Herodotus, the Spartans, who were at that time celebrating the festival of **Hyacinthus**, delayed making a decision until they were persuaded by a guest, **Chileos of Tegea**, who pointed out the danger to all of Greece if the Athenians surrendered.^[22] When, the next day the Athenian emissaries delivered an ultimatum to the Spartans, they were amazed to hear that a task force was in fact already *en route*; the Spartan army was marching to meet the Persians.^[23]

3. Prelude

When Mardonius learned of the Spartan force, he destroyed Athens, tearing down whatever was standing.^[24] He then retreated towards Thebes, hoping to lure the Greek army into a territory suitable for the Persian cavalry.^[24] Mardonius created a fortified encampment on the north bank of the Asopus river in Boeotia, and waited for the Greeks.^[25] The Athenians sent **8,000** hoplites, led by **Aristides** along with **600 Plataean exiles**, to join the Allied army. The army marched in Boeotia across the passes of Mt Cithaeron, arriving **near Plataea**, above the Persian position on the Asopus. Ordered by the commanding general Pausanias, the Greeks took a position opposite the Persian lines but remained on high ground.^[26] Knowing that he had little hope of successfully attacking the Greek positions, Mardonius sought to sow dissension amongst the Allies, or lure them down into the plain.^[26] Plutarch reports that a conspiracy was discovered amongst some Athenians, who were planning to betray the Allied cause; although this account is not universally accepted, it may indicate Mardonius's use of intelligence and intrigue.^[26] The Persian also sent hit-and-run cavalry attacks against the Greek lines, possibly to lure the Greeks down to the plain in pursuit.^{[26][27]} Although initially having some success,^[28] his strategy backfired when the cavalry commander **Masistius** was killed, whereupon the cavalry retreated.^{[28][29]} Their morale boosted by this small victory, the Greeks moved forward, still on higher ground, to a new position nearer Mardonius's camp.^[30] The **Spartans** and Tegeans were on a ridge to the right of the line, the Athenians on a hillock on the left, and the other contingents on the lower ground between.^[26] In response Mardonius brought his men up to the Asopus and arrayed them for battle. However, both sides refused to attack; Herodotus claims this is because both sides received bad omens for attacking during sacrificial rituals.^[31] The armies thus stayed camped in their present locations for **8 days** and all the while new Greek troops arrived.^[32] Mardonius then sought to break the stalemate by sending his cavalry to attack the passes of Mt Cithaeron; this raid resulted in the capture a convoy of provisions intended for the Greeks.^[32] Two further days passed, during which time the supply lines of the Greeks continued to be menaced.^[26] Mardonius then launched a new cavalry raid on the Greek lines, which succeeded in blocking the Gargaphian Spring, which had been the only source of water for the Greek army (they could not use the Asopus due to the Persian archers).^[33] Coupled with the lack of food, the restriction of the water supply made the Greek position untenable, so they decided to retreat to a position in front of **Plataea**, from where they could guard the passes and have access to fresh water.^[34] To prevent the Persian cavalry attacking the retreat, it was to be performed that night.^[34] However, the retreat went badly. The Allied contingents in the centre missed their appointed position and ended up scattered in front of Plataea itself.^[26] The Athenians, Tegeans and Spartans, who had been guarding the rear of the retreat, had not even begun to retreat by daybreak.^[26] A single Spartan division was thus left on the ridge to guard the rear, whilst the Spartans and Tegeans retreated uphill; Pausanias also instructed the Athenians to begin the retreat and if possible to join up with the Spartans.^{[26][35]} However, the Athenians at first retreated directly towards Plataea,^[35] and thus the Allied battle line remained fragmented as the Persian camp began to stir.^[26]

4. The opposing forces

I. The Greeks

According to Herodotus, the **Spartans sent 45,000 men** commanded by **Pausanias**; 5,000 *Spartiates* (full citizen soldiers), 5,000 *perioekoi* (other Lacedaemonians) and 35,000 *helots* (seven per Spartiate).^[36] This was probably the largest Spartan force ever assembled.^[26] The Greek army had been reinforced by contingents of hoplites from the other Allied city-states, as shown in the table.

City	# of men	City	# of men	City	# of men
1 Sparta ^[36]	10000	8 Athens ^[36]	8000	15 Corinth ^[36]	5000
2 Megara ^[36]	3000	9 Sikyon ^[36]	3000	16 Tegea ^[36]	1500
3 Phleious ^[36]	1000	10 Troezen ^[36]	1000	17 Anactorium & 18 Leukas ^[36]	800
4 Epidauros ^[36]	800	11 Orchomenian Arcadians ^[36]	600	19 Eretria and Styra ^[36]	600
5 Plataea ^[36]	600	12 Aegina ^[36]	500	20 Ambrakia ^[36]	500
6 Chalcidike ^[36]	400	13 Mycenae and Tiryns ^[36]	400	21 Hermione ^[36]	300
7 Potidaea ^[36]	300	14 Cephallonia ^[36]	200	22 Lepreon ^[36]	200
				Total	38,700 ^[37]

After Herodotus, there were a total of **69,500** lightly armed troops; 35,000 helots,^[37] and 34,500 troops from the rest of Greece; roughly one per hoplite.^[37] Herodotus also tells us that there were also 1,800 Thespians (but not how they were equipped), giving a total strength of **110,000 men**.^[38] The number of hoplites is accepted as reasonable (and possible); the Athenians alone had fielded 10,000 hoplites at the Battle of Marathon.^[26] However, the number of light troops is often rejected as exaggerated.^[26] Conversely, some historians have accepted these numbers and used them as a population census of Greece at the time.

II. The Persians

According to Herodotus, the Persians numbered **300,000** and were accompanied by troops from Greek city states which supported the Persian cause (including **Thebes**).^[39] He admits that no-one counted the latter, so he guesses that there were 50,000 of them.^[39] **Ctesias** who wrote a history of Persia based on Persian archives, claimed there were **120,000 Persian** and 7,000 Greek soldiers, but his account is generally garbled (for instance, placing the battle before Salamis). Nevertheless, his figure is remarkably close to that generated by modern consensus. The figure of 300,000 has been doubted, along with many of Herodotus's numbers, by many modern historians. Since modern consensus place the total number of troops for the Persian invasion at around 250,000^[40], a number of 300,000 does not find favor with modern historians. One approach to estimating the size of the Persian army has been to estimate how many men might feasibly have been accommodated within the Persian camp; this approach gives figures of **between 70,000 and 120,000 men** ^{[41][42]} Most estimates for the total Persian force are generally in this range. ^{[43][44][45]} Munro and Macan note that Herodotus mentions six superior military commanders and 29 *μυρίαρχοι* (*muriarchoi*), commanders of a *baivarabam*.^[46] This was the tactical unit of the ancient Persian infantry that numbered 10,000 men; thus, if these units were all at full strength, a force approximating 300,000 might have been possible.^[47]

5. Strategic and tactical considerations

In some ways, the run-up to Plataea resembled that at the Battle of Marathon; there was a prolonged stalemate in which neither side risked attacking the other.^[26] The reasons for this were primarily tactical, and similar to the situation at Marathon; the Greek hoplites did not want to risk being outflanked by the Persian cavalry, and the lightly armed Persian infantry could not hope to assault well defended positions.^[26] From a strategic point of view, both sides wished for a decisive battle which would tip the war in their favor.^{[48][26]} Equally, the strategic situation allowed both sides to procrastinate, since food supplies were in ample supply for both ^{[48][26]}. Under these conditions, the tactical considerations outweighed the strategic need for action.

However, when Mardonius' raids disrupted the Greek supply chain, it forced a strategic rethink on the part of the Greeks. Instead of moving to attack, they looked to retreat slightly and secure lines of communication.^[34] Despite this defensive move from the Greeks, it was in fact the chaos resulting from this retreat which finally ended the stalemate. Mardonius perceived this as a full-on retreat, in effect thinking that the battle was already over, and sought to pursue the Greeks.^[49] Since he did not expect the Greeks to fight, the tactical problems were no longer an issue, and he tried to take advantage of the altered strategic situation.^[26]

6. The Battle

On discovering the Greeks had abandoned their positions, Mardonius, now doubly convinced of Spartan cowardice and of his correct judgement in deciding to fight them here and now, chased after them. Seeing that the Greek formation was divided in three and judging them to be in flight, he decided to attack, without realizing he was sending his force into a trap. The Persian cavalry and archers first came upon the Spartans who were still moving, and the infantry arrived soon after. The Spartans retreated higher in the mountains where they were protected from cavalry attacks. The cavalry and archers did little damage and withdrew when the infantry arrived. The Spartans asked the Athenians for help, but they were unable to send any because they were being attacked by the Theban mercenaries of Mardonius. The numerically superior Persian infantry were of the heavy (by Persian standards) *sparabara* formation that was still much lighter than the Greek *phalanx*. The Persian defense weapon was a large wicker shield, compared to the heavy bronze shield of the phalanx. The Persians formed a shield wall and started firing volleys of arrows against the **Spartans** and the **Tegeans**. After suffering these volleys for some time, the Tegeans attacked, forcing the Spartans to follow suit. The Greek long spears [note: not as long as the later Macedonian *sarissa*] gave them a tactical advantage over the Persian short spears and swords, and the battle soon turned into a slaughter. The Persians were annihilated; Mardonius himself was killed by a Spartan named **Aeimnestus** [Gr: forever remembered!]. In the meantime, while the Spartans were still suffering from the arrows, the Athenians moved to help but found themselves facing the Persians' Greek allies. While most Greeks feigned cowardice, the Thebans attacked and fought bravely, being repelled with 300 casualties. Herodotus claims that the rest of the Greek and Persian forces did not fight, something very dubious. **Unfortunately, no other ancient source with a full description of the battle has survived to say otherwise.**

The Persian **Artabazus**, who had unsuccessfully tried to convince Mardonius to avoid a pitched battle, then took command and immediately retreated, allowing the Greeks to capture their camp. Herodotus claims that only **43,000** Persians survived the battle, while the Greeks as a whole lost only **159** men; and that only Spartans, Tegeans and Athenians died as they were the only ones who fought. Plutarch, who had access to other sources, gives **1,360 Greek casualties**, while both Ephorus and Diodorus tally the Greek casualties to over **10,000**. However, historical records of the period are notoriously biased or inaccurate and the real number of casualties will never truly be known. Use of the ancient casualty figures places Plataea in the list of the **most lethal battles in world history**, and it may have been more lethal than any preceding battle.

7. Aftermath




Diagram of the Battle at Plataea



The Serpent Column



The River Strymon



Delphi, Central Greece

According to tradition, the Battle of Mycale occurred on the same day and the Greek fleet destroyed the Persian fleet in the Aegean Sea off the coast of Ionia. The Persian army, under the command of Artabazus tried to retreat all the way back to Asia Minor. **Most of the 43,000 survivors were attacked and killed by the forces of Alexander I the Philhellene at the estuary of the Strymon river.** This ended the defensive phase of the Persian War, although the Persians continued to interfere in Greek politics until the conquer of the Persian empire by Alexander the Great, in the 4th century BC. However, this was the last time the Persians tried to invade the Greek mainland with the goal of total conquest.

A bronze column in the shape of intertwined snakes (*Serpent column*) was created from the melted-down Persian weapons acquired in the battle plunder of the Persian camp and was offered at the oracle of Delphi, which commemorated all the Greek city-states who participated in the battle. Part of it still survives in the Hippodrome of Constantinople in present-day Istanbul, where it was carried by Constantine the Great during the founding of his city on the Greek colony of Byzantium. It lists all city-states that took part in the battle, confirming Herodotus' account (but not his numbers). The Greeks also took Mardonius' payroll money and other treasures, and are recorded to have marveled at the splendor of the Persian camp, asking why being so wealthy, the Persians wanted to conquer their poor peninsula. Another important and long-lasting aftermath was that after the Persian wars the Persians started recruiting and relying on Greek mercenaries. Eventually, after the March of the 10,000 [viz. Xenophon's *Anabasis*], their superior fighting ability due to their armor and tactics was demonstrated, leading the way for Alexander the Great's conquests.

8. Accounts of famous Spartans

Aristodemos: Among the men considered to have fought most valiantly at Plataea was one Aristodemos, the lone Spartan survivor of the slaughter of the 300 at the Battle of Thermopylae. A year of disgrace and reproach had attended him upon his return from that previous engagement. He is said to have appeared to be "courting death" in his brave actions, leaving his place in line and "acting like a madman" and ironically for this very reason was given no special honors accorded the others who also fought with distinction but with not quite the same valor.

Kallikrates: Considered the "*most beautiful man, not among the Spartans only, but in the whole Greek camp*" Callicrates was eager to distinguish himself that day as a warrior but was deprived of the chance by a stray arrow that pierced his side while standing in formation. When the battle commenced he insisted on making the charge with the rest but collapsed within a short distance. His last words: "*I grieve not because I have to die for my country, but because I have not lifted my arm against the enemy.*" ¹⁵⁰

9. Legacy

a. The Battle of Plataea is mentioned in *The 300 Spartans*, when the spoken epilogue explains that the Persians were ejected from Greece through the Battles of Salamis and Plataea.

b. In the 2007 film *300* directed by **Zack Snyder**, the movie's final scenes reference the battle of Plataea. The Greek to Persian ratio is given as 1:3 ("Good odds for any Greek" he said.) with the Greek force numbering 40,000 against 120,000 Persians. ¹⁵¹

10. References

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4. Herodotus VI, 44 [2]
5. Holland, pp178-179
6. Herodotus VI, 101 [3]
7. Herodotus, VI, 113 [4]
8. Holland, pp213-214
9. Herodotus VII, 35 [5]
10. Herodotus VII, 31 VII, 32
11. Herodotus VII, 145 [6]
12. Holland, pp255-257
13. Herodotus VIII, 18 [7]
14. Herodotus, VIII, 21 [8]
15. Herodotus VIII, 71 [9]
16. Holland, p303
17. Holland, p333-335
18. Holland, pp327-329

19. Holland, p330
20. Holland, pp336-338
21. Herodotus IX, 7 [10]
22. Herodotus IX, 6-9 [11]
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35. Herodotus IX, 55
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49. Herodotus, IX, 58
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51. Frank Miller (comics)

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12. Some personal notes for the History Channel, U.S.A [c/o Kristin]

1. The battle at Plataea did indeed put an end to the Persian invasions in Greece, and Herodotus himself read his own *Histories* at the Olympic Games, where he was widely acclaimed. It is my personal opinion however, that of equal importance were:

[a] the **Battle of Pydna** that took place on June 22, 168 BCE between the last king of Macedon, Perseus and the Roman general Aemilius Paullus. As I practically live on the battle grounds, I'd be more than happy to assist the HC to film a documentary *in situ* [viz. my relevant paper enclosed];

[b] the **Battle of Marathon of 490 BCE** [viz. my note, page 1 of this text]. My friend, Mr. George Papalios, who directs the Greek Film Center in Athens, has asked me to write a scenario re this battle in view of commemorating its 2,500-year anniversary in 2010. I obliged, and am presently preparing it helped by colleagues in the U.S, e.g. Prof. Carol Thomas of the History Dept. at the University of Washington where I teach. Alas, the efforts of the GFC to find co-sponsors or co-producers for such a film have failed so far... To my knowledge, neither Mr. George Lucas nor Mr. Snyder expressed interest in such a project. Hence it is my hope that the HC may show interest to step in and film a documentary instead, with the collaboration (incl. finance issues) of the GFC and the Hellenic Union of Traditional Riders, which I have the honor to preside. Last but not least, there is ample time from now to 2010 to work the details for such a joint venture.

2. In the HC scenario re the Battle of Plataea, it is –again—my personal opinion that important “details” such as those described below should be mentioned as they would make it more interesting to HC viewers:

[a] The bios of famous Spartans such as Leotychides, Aristodemos, Kallikrates and Pausanias [viz. my text above]. The irony of the latter, namely Pausanias, is that although this Spartan general contributed widely in the Greek victory, later in life he went to work for the Persians (!), same as Xenophon in later times. As one would expect, he was recalled in Sparta to be judged as traitor, was imprisoned and starved to death. This certainly was a very tragic end of a Spartan general parallel to none...

[b] Some bio notes of the Macedonian king Alexander I the *Philhellene*, who according to Herodotus rode all the way from northern Greece to Plataea overnight (?) to inform the allied Greek armies (some claim that he only met with the Athenian general Aristides) that the great Persian army was marching against them. The irony in his case is that although he was named “Philhellene” (Gr: friend of the Greeks), when he attempted to participate in the *stadion* foot run at the Olympics, the Elean judges refused his entry claiming that he was a barbarian (!). Finally, he convinced the judges that he was of Argive origin, i.e. of the *Temenidae*, and was allowed to participate in the race. However, again according to Herodotus, although he *ΣΥΝΕΞΕΠΙΠΤΕ ΤΩ ΠΡΩΤΩ* [finished equal first], the judges attributed the olive wreath to a Thessalian named Torymbas thus refusing to honor him (Antikas T.G., *Olympica Hippica*, Euandros editions, Athens, 2004).

3. As far back as the late 90's, I have had the chance [a] to consult the National Geographic on a series of articles concerning Alexander's and Bucephalas' campaign into Asia, and to help their staff photographer, Mr. James Stanfield follow the exact itinerary of Alexander from Dion to Turkey; [b] to help the Discovery Channel film a sequence of their series “Mummy Autopsy” entitled “Who Killed T-38?” concerning a Greek hero assassinated in the same way as Philip of Macedon, in the mid-4th century BCE. This was a chance discovery at a human cemetery found south of Thessaloniki and containing heroes buried with horses. My wife, Laura Wynn, who is an anthropologist, analyzed the human remains and I was asked to analyze those of the horses. Other than the aforementioned 50-min. documentary, there has been a recent publication concerning the archaeozoological finds confirming Herodotus! [see attached CD and paper].

In this context, it is my pleasure to propose two more documentaries to the History Channel, as follows:

[a] a first one concerning a more recent discovery, namely that of a “catapulted” hero-victim found near Beroia. I attach a power point concerning this rare find, in the hope the HC will find it interesting, particularly if it wishes to film a documentary concerning the use of catapults from the 4th century BCE to Roman and later times. I believe that the issue will be equally interesting to its viewers.

[b] a second one concerning the surprising “fish eating” horses –and the Homeric burial habit of heroes and horses placed on the pyre together [*Iliad* 23.175]. To this effect, please find enclosed my publication.

Yours friendly, Theodore G. Antikas

Makrygialos-Methoni, 12-03.2008